Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, Daria Novikov,
George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan with William Runkel
March 12, 2025, 8:00 pm ET
Click here
to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This
map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here
to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a
computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this
data-heavy tool.
Click here
to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain
map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will
update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note:
The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on March 12. ISW will
cover subsequent reports in the March 13 Russian Offensive Campaign
Assessment.
Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov offered a vague response on March 12 to the US-Ukrainian 30-day ceasefire proposal.
Peskov responded to a question about Russia's response to the joint
temporary ceasefire proposal, stating that "we don't want to get ahead
of ourselves."[1] Peskov stated that Russia expects US Secretary of
State Marco Rubio and US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz to inform
the Kremlin about the details of the US-Ukrainian negotiations.[2]
Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on March 12 that its
sources in the Russian government stated that the US-Ukrainian
temporary ceasefire proposal surprised the Kremlin, and a source close
to the Russian presidential administration stated that the Kremlin
expected the United States to discuss such a proposal with Russia in
private before publicly announcing it, thereby providing the Kremlin
time to formulate a prepared response.[3]
Russian
President Vladimir Putin may hold hostage the ceasefire proposal to
which Ukraine has agreed in order to extract preemptive concessions
before formal negotiations to end the war have started. Reuters reported
on March 12 that senior Russian sources stated that a deal on the
temporary ceasefire would have to "take into account" Russia's advances
on the battlefield and "address [Russia's] concerns."[4] Bloomberg reported
on March 12 that sources familiar with the Kremlin's thinking and the
situation stated that Putin will "stretch the timeline" for agreeing to
the temporary ceasefire in order to ensure that his stipulations "are
taken into account."[5] A source close to the Kremlin stated that Russia
may demand a halt to weapons supplies to Ukraine as a
condition of agreeing to the temporary ceasefire, but did not specify
whether such a halt would include all international weapons provisions
to Ukraine or only those from select countries. Suspending US or other
military assistance to Ukraine during a ceasefire would be extremely
advantageous to Russia, which continues to receive critical supplies and
assistance from Iran, North Korea, and the People's Republic of
China.[6] Such an enormous concession would also destroy US leverage in
future negotiations, in addition to violating the conditions under which
Ukraine agreed to the ceasefire in the first place.[7]
Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported
on March 12 that a source close to the Russian Presidential
Administration stated that the Kremlin would "formally" give a "positive
response" to the temporary ceasefire proposal but would also demand
"impossible conditions" to which Ukraine cannot agree.[8] The source
stated that Putin wants to remove Ukraine from talks so that Russia can
engage in negotiations with the United States alone while also
"correcting the situation on the front" to strengthen Russia's
negotiating position. The source added that the conditions of the
temporary ceasefire "must suit Russia" and that Russia's agreement to a
temporary ceasefire during which Ukraine continues to receive weapons
and financing from its partners and allies is "stupid." These leaks may
be intentional and part of a Russian negotiating strategy that aims to
push the United States to renegotiate its deal with Ukraine on the
temporary ceasefire.
Senior US and Ukrainian officials
have said that the purpose of the temporary ceasefire is for Russia and
Ukraine to demonstrate their willingness for peace and that the
temporary ceasefire and negotiations to end the war are separate
matters, whereas the Kremlin may intend to conjoin them. The
US-Ukrainian joint statement announcing the temporary ceasefire proposal
on March 11 noted that Ukraine and the United States intend to name
their negotiating teams and immediately begin negotiations toward an
enduring peace — noting the distinction between their March 11 temporary
ceasefire proposal and future peace negotiations.[9] US Secretary of
State Marco Rubio stated on March 11 following the US-Ukrainian talks in
Jeddah that the best goodwill gesture Russia can give would be to
accept the ceasefire proposal and that if Russia says no, "then we'll
know the impediment to peace."[10] Rubio characterized Ukraine's
agreement to the ceasefire as the "kind of concession you would need to
see in order to end the conflict."[11] Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky stated on March 12 that Ukraine will use the 30-day ceasefire
to prepare agreements with partners regarding a sustainable peace and
long-term security guarantees.[12] The Kremlin's reported intention to
make demands supporting its overall war objectives before agreeing to
the temporary ceasefire violates the stated purpose of the ceasefire and
the sequence of negotiations that US President Donald Trump has laid
out. If the Kremlin holds the ceasefire hostage to demand preemptive
concessions while continuing to pursue battlefield victories, that would
strongly indicate that Russia lacks any urgency about ending the war
and is uninterested in making any meaningful concessions.
Russian
insider reports about the demands that the Kremlin may make before
agreeing to the temporary ceasefire are in line with Russian officials'
public statements in the past months. Putin outlined in June
2024 — and reiterated in December 2024 — his prerequisite demands for
agreeing to a ceasefire.[13] These demands include the full Ukrainian
withdrawal from the territory in Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and
Kherson oblasts that Russian forces currently do not occupy and
Ukraine's official abandonment of its goal of joining NATO. Kremlin
officials have repeatedly insisted that any peace negotiations to take
into consideration the "realities on the ground," and Russian Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov notably claimed on February 24 that Russia would
only stop military activity in Ukraine when peace negotiations bring
about a "solid, stable result that suits Russia" and account for the
"realities" of the battlefield.[14] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister
Sergei Ryabkov told Russian state newswire RIA Novosti on
February 24 that Russia will not agree to a ceasefire that does not
address the "root causes" of the war.[15] Kremlin officials, including
Putin, have repeatedly claimed that any peace agreement must take into
account the "root causes" of the war, which the Kremlin has defined as
NATO's alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward and the
Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians
and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine.[16]
A leaked
February 2025 document from a think tank close to the Russian Federal
Security Service (FSB) that outlined a possible Kremlin negotiating
strategy is largely in line with the Kremlin's recent public rhetoric
and the March 12 Russian insider source reports. The Washington Post reported
on March 12 that a European intelligence service obtained a document
from a Russian think tank close to the Russian FSB's Fifth Service
(which oversees operations in Ukraine among other things) written in the
week before the February 18 US-Russian talks in Saudi Arabia.[17] The
document states that a peace settlement to the war in Ukraine "cannot
happen before 2026," rejects the deployment of peacekeepers to Ukraine,
and calls for recognition of Russia's sovereignty over occupied Ukraine.
The document calls for the creation of a buffer zone on the
international Ukrainian-Russian border, including near Bryansk and
Belgorod oblasts, and a "demilitarized zone" in southern Ukraine near
Odesa Oblast and occupied Crimea. The document also states that Russia
needs to "completely dismantle" the current Ukrainian government and
rejects a possible Ukrainian commitment to not join NATO or to hold
elections that include pro-Russian parties as insufficient measures. The
document rejects any US plans to continue supplying weapons to Ukraine
after any future peace deal and any Ukrainian plans to maintain its
current number of military personnel. The document outlines ways in
which Russia can strengthen its negotiating position by exacerbating
tensions between the United States and both the People's Republic of
China (PRC) and the EU. The document also calls for Russia to grant the
United States access to Russian-controlled minerals in occupied Ukraine
and for the Kremlin to focus on normalizing its relations with the
United States by restoring embassy functions and appointing Alexander
Darchiev as the Russian Ambassador to the United States.
The
Kremlin has followed through with many of the document's suggestions in
recent weeks. Kremlin officials have recently rejected the possible
deployment of European peacekeepers to Ukraine, have identified the 2022
peace negotiations in Istanbul (that would have effectively disarmed
Ukraine, banned Ukraine from receiving any foreign weapons, and forced
Ukraine to commit never to participate in military blocs), and have
offered to sign investment deals with the United States to extract
minerals in Russia and occupied Ukraine.[18] Recent Russian rhetoric has
also increasingly attempted to drive wedges between the United States
and Europe.[19] Putin asked Russian Chief of the General Staff Army
General Valery Gerasimov during a visit to a Russian command post in
Kursk Oblast on March 12 to "think in the future about creating a
security zone" along the Ukrainian-Russian international border.[20]
US
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director John Ratcliffe and Russian
Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Head Sergey Naryshkin had a phone
call on March 11 amid talks about the war in Ukraine. The SVR
Press Bureau reported about the call on March 12 and claimed that
Naryshkin and Ratcliffe agreed to maintain regular contacts to help
"ensure international stability and security" and "reduce confrontation"
in bilateral relations.[21]
Russian forces recently seized Sudzha amid continued Russian assaults in Kursk Oblast on March 12. Geolocated
footage published on March 12 indicates that Russian forces recently
seized Sudzha and advanced to southern Zaoleshenka (immediately
northwest of Sudzha).[22] A Ukrainian source reportedly affiliated with
Ukrainian military intelligence stated on March 12 that Ukrainian forces
have started withdrawing from Sudzha.[23] Russian milbloggers credited
elements of the 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade, 22nd Motorized Rifle
Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad
Military District [LMD]), and 2nd Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian Main
Military Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) with the seizure of Sudzha and
claimed that Russian forces are conducting clearing operations in the
settlement.[24] Geolocated footage published on March 11 indicates that
Russian forces recently advanced west of Basivka (west of Sudzha across
the international border in Sumy Oblast).[25] Russian milbloggers
claimed that Russian forces advanced near Sverdlikovo (northwest of
Sudzha), west of Kazachya Loknya (north of Sudzha), within Zaoleshenka,
within southeastern Goncharovka (just west of Sudzha), west of
Kurilovka, north of Guyevo (both south of Sudzha), and southwest of
Zhuravka (west of Sudzha in Sumy Oblast) and west Oleksandriia (south of
Sudzha in Sumy Oblast).[26] Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting
continued near Zaoleshenka, Goncharovka, and Guyevo and just across the
international border in Sumy Oblast near Zhuravka, Novenke, and Basivka
(all west of Sudzha).[27] A Russian milblogger called for Russian forces
to create a buffer zone — likely in Sumy Oblast — after Russian forces
push Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast.[28]
Russian milbloggers
claimed on March 12 that Ukrainian forces conducted HIMARS strikes
against Russian forces in Kursk Oblast.[29] ISW cannot independently
verify these Russian claims, however. Western media reported on March 5
that the Trump administration specifically suspended intelligence
sharing supporting target designation for Ukrainian HIMARS strikes, and
US and Ukrainian officials confirmed on March 11 that the United States
restarted intelligence sharing with Ukraine.[30]
Russan
President Vladimir Putin visited a Russian military command post in
Kursk Oblast for the first time since Ukraine's incursion into Kursk
Oblast in August 2024 — demonstrating Putin's desire to use Russia's
seizure of Sudzha to project military success and strength against the
backdrop of the US-Ukrainian temporary ceasefire proposal. Putin
visited a command post in Kursk Oblast and heard reports from Russian
Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov.[31] Gerasimov
specifically commended elements of the "Veterany" Assault Detachment
(Russian Volunteer Corps), 11th VDV Brigade, 30th Motorized Rifle
Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th AC, LMD), and "Akhmat"
Spetsnaz Detachment for conducting the operation in which Russian forces
used an underground pipeline to covertly attack behind Ukrainian
positions in Sudzha. Putin thanked elements of the 76th and 106th VDV
divisions, 11th and 83rd VDV brigades, 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV
Division), 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), 810th Naval
Infantry brigade (Black Sea Fleet), 177th Naval Infantry Brigade
(Caspian Flotilla), 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms
Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), 22nd Motorized Rifle
Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th AC, LMD), 1220th Motorized
Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, Moscow Military
District [MMD]), "Akhmat" Spetsnaz, and "Veterany" Assault Detachment
for their efforts in Kursk Oblast. Putin acknowledged that Russian
forces have yet to completely push Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast
and stated that Russian forces must seize all of Kursk Oblast "in the
shortest possible time."
This is only the second time that Putin
has visited Russian forces on the frontline since the start of Russia's
full-scale invasion in February 2022. Putin visited the Russian "Dnepr"
Grouping of Forces' headquarters in occupied Kherson Oblast and the
"Vostok" Rosgvardia headquarters in occupied Luhansk Oblast in April
2023.[32] Putin wore a military uniform during his visit to the Kursk
Oblast headquarters — a notable move as he wore a suit in his April 2023
visits to the frontline. Putin is likely trying to posture himself as
an engaged wartime leader and to include himself among the Russian
military-political leaders responsible for recent Russian advances in
Kursk Oblast.[33] Putin is also likely attempting to portray himself as a
strong and effective military commander ahead of US-Russian meetings,
including a meeting with US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve
Witkoff on March 13 during which the delegations will likely discuss the
US-Ukrainian temporary ceasefire proposal.
Key Takeaways:
- Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov offered a vague response on March 12 to the US-Ukrainian 30-day ceasefire proposal.
- Russian
President Vladimir Putin may hold hostage the ceasefire proposal to
which Ukraine has agreed in order to extract preemptive concessions
before formal negotiations to end the war have started.
- Senior
US and Ukrainian officials have said that the purpose of the temporary
ceasefire is for Russia and Ukraine to demonstrate their willingness for
peace and that the temporary ceasefire and negotiations to end the war
are separate matters, whereas the Kremlin may intend to conjoin them.
- Russian
insider reports about the demands that the Kremlin may make before
agreeing to the temporary ceasefire are in line with Russian officials'
public statements in the past months.
- US
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director John Ratcliffe and Russian
Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Head Sergey Naryshkin had a phone
call on March 11 amid talks about the war in Ukraine.
- Russian forces recently seized Sudzha amid continued Russian assaults in Kursk Oblast on March 12.
- Russan
President Vladimir Putin visited a Russian military command post in
Kursk Oblast for the first time since Ukraine's incursion into Kursk
Oblast in August 2024 — demonstrating Putin's desire to use Russia's
seizure of Sudzha to project military success and strength against the
backdrop of the US-Ukrainian temporary ceasefire proposal.
- Ukrainian
forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces
recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Borova, Toretsk, and Velyka
Novosilka.
We
do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities
are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the
military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue
to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on
the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on
combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations
of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes
against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian
Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Push Ukrainian forces back from the
international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube
artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort
#2 — Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into
eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
See topline text.
Russian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Kharkiv Oblast (Russian
objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border
with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of
Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on March 12 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on March 11 and 12.[34]
The
spokesperson for a Ukranian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction
stated on March 12 that Ukrainian forces are prepared for possible
Russian redeployments from Kursk Oblast to the Kharkiv direction.[35]
The spokesperson stated that Russian troops usually attempt to advance
using small groups on motorcycle but may encounter difficulties using
this tactic given muddy weather conditions.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Luhansk Oblast
(Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push
westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on March 12 but did not make confirmed advances.
Russian
forces continued ground attacks east of Kupyansk near Kucherivka and
Petropavlivka and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on
March 11 and 12.[36]
A Ukrainian drone regiment reported that
Russian forces are concentrating near the east (left) bank of the Oskil
River for future assaults on the west (right) bank during more favorable
weather conditions in Spring 2025.[37] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of
Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated that Russian forces
were previously able to use icy weather conditions to transfer and
replenish forces on the west (right) bank of the Oskil River are now
using these force accumulations to increase the number of attacks in the
Kupyansk direction.[38]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.
Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 12 indicates
that Russian forces recently advanced into northern Bohuslavka
(northeast of Borova) and likely seized Zahryzove (immediately northeast
of Bohuslavka).[39][40]
Russian forces continued ground attacks
northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka, Bohuslavka, and Zahryzove;
east of Borova near Zelenyi Hai; and southeast of Borova near
Cherneshchyna, Hrekivka, on March 11 and 12.[41]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on March 12 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized three
square kilometers near Yampolivka (northeast of Lyman) and advanced west
of Ivanivka, 300 meters from Novolyubivka (both northeast of Lyman)
towards Nove (north of Lyman and west of Novolyubivka), and 200 meters
in depth near Myrne (northeast of Lyman).[42]
Russian forces
continued ground attacks north of Lyman near Nove, Katerynivka, Zelena
Dolyna, and Novomykhailivka; northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka and
Myrne; and east of Lyman in the Serebryanske forest area on March 11 and
12.[43]
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the
Lyman direction stated that Russian forces have been increasingly
striking Ukrainian frontline positions in the Lyman direction with
Shahed drones since late February 2024 and are using the drones like
"mini" glide bombs.[44]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on March 12 but did not advance.
Russian
forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and Hryhorivka,
east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near
Ivano-Darivka on March 11 and 12.[45]
Order of Battle: Elements of
the Russian 2nd Artillery Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA],
formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern
Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Siversk
direction.[46]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on March 12 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense
(MoD), claimed on March 11 and 12 that Russian forces seized Novomarkove
(north of Chasiv Yar).[47] A milblogger claimed that Russian forces
advanced 1.5 kilometers north of Novopivnichnyi Microraion in western
Chasiv Yar.[48]
Russian forces continued ground attacks in Chasiv
Yar, including within Shevchenko Microraion in southern Chasiv Yar;
northwest of Chasiv Yar near Mayske; southeast of Chasiv Yar near
Kurdyumivka; and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky, Predtechyne, and
Bila Hora on March 11 and 12.[49]
Order of Battle: Elements of the
“Sever-V” Volunteer Brigade and the “Dikaya Division of Donbass" (both
of the Russian Volunteer Corps) and the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division,
including its 331st VDV Regiment, are reportedly operating in the Chasiv
Yar direction.[50] Elements of the Russian 6th Motorized Rifle Brigade
(3rd CAA) are reportedly operating near Predtechyne.[51]
Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.
Assessed
Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 12 indicates
that Ukrainian forces recently advanced along 8 Bereznia Street in
southern Toretsk.[52]
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated
footage published on March 11 indicates that Russian forces recently
advanced to Soborna Street and towards Mykhaila Hrushevskoho Street in
northern Toretsk.[53]
Russian forces conducted offensive
operations near Toretsk itself; east of Toretsk near Druzhba; northeast
of Toretsk near Ozaryanivka; and north of Toretsk near Krymske,
Dyliivka, and Dachne on March 11 and 12.[54] Russian sources claimed
that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked in Toretsk.[55]
A
Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction posted footage on
March 12 of Russian forces conducting a reinforced platoon-sized
mechanized assault in the area.[56] The brigade reported that Ukrainian
forces destroyed two tanks and that the other two tanks retreated. An
officer in the Ukrainian brigade stated that Russian forces have
increased the intensity of their attacks in the Toretsk direction and
are conducting both mechanized assaults and small infantry assaults.[57]
The officer stated that Russian forces are conducting fewer glide bomb
and artillery strikes but are using a "huge concentration" of all types
of drones.
Order of Battle: Elements of the 68th and 163rd tank
regiments, 381st Artillery Regiment, 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle
regiments, and 174th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (all of the 150th
Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near
Toretsk.[58] Elements of the 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA,
formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) and 238th
Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Toretsk
direction.[59]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.
Assessed
Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 8 indicates
that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Lysivka (southeast of
Pokrovsk).[60]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed
that Russian forces "significantly" advanced between Zaporizhzhia and
Oleksiivka (both southwest of Pokrovsk).[61] A Russian source claimed
that Ukrainian forces advanced in southern Udachne (southwest of
Pokrovsk) where Ukrainian forces are counterattacking.[62]
Russian
forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near
Tarasivka and Vodyane Druhe; east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka and
Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka, Dachenske, Novotroitske, and
Mykolaivka; south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko, Vidrozhenya (formerly
Novyi Trud), Novoukrainka, and Zelene; southwest of Pokrovsk near
Pishchane, Zvirove, Leontovychi (formerly Pershe Travyna), Udachne,
Kotlyne, Nadiivka, Preobrazhenka, Novooleksandrivka, Nadiivka,
Bohdanivka, and Kotlyarivka; and west of Pokrovsk toward Serhiivka on
March 11 and 12.[63]
An officer in a Ukrainian brigade operating
in the Pokrovsk direction stated on March 12 that Russian forces have
intensified infantry assaults in the area.[64] The spokesperson of
another Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated
that Russian forces conduct infantry assaults at night, presumably in
order to better conceal themselves from Ukrainian reconnaissance.[65]
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st
CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near
Pokrovsk.[66] Elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) are
reportedly operating near Kalynove (east of Pokrovsk).[67]
Russan forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on March 12 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil and Oleksiivka on March 11 and 12.[68]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction.
Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 12 indicates
that Russian forces recently seized Dniproenerhiya (north of Velyka
Novosilka).[69] The Russian MoD and other Russian sources claimed that
elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern
Military District [EMD]) and the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific
Fleet) participated in the seizure of the settlement.[70]
Unconfirmed
claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced to
Vesele (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) and northwest of
Dniproenerhiya.[71]
Russian milbloggers claimed on March 12 that
elements of the Russian 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized
Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) seized Burlatske (northwest of Velyka
Novosilka), but ISW assessed that Russian forces seized the settlement
as of March 2.[72]
Russian forces attacked north of Velyka
Novosilka near Skudne, Dniproenerhiya, and Vesele; northeast of Velyka
Novosilka near Rozlyv; northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Burlatske and
Vilne Pole; west of Velyka Novosilka near Pryvilne and Novosilka; and
southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil on March 11 and 12.[73]
Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Russian forces continued ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 12 but did not make any confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced in eastern
Pyatykhatky and five kilometers near Zherebyanky (both northwest of
Robotyne).[74]
Russian forces conducted ground attacks north of
Robotyne near Novodanylivka and northwest of Robotyne near Pyatykhatky,
Stepove, Shcherbaky, Kamyanske, and Lobkove and toward Novoandriivka on
March 11 and 12.[75]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian
247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly
operating in Pyatykhatky.[76]
Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Dnipro direction on March 11 and 12 but did not advance.[77]
The
"Atesh" Crimea-based Ukrainian partisan group reported on March 12 that
Ukrainian partisans conducted successful sabotage attacks against a
Russian military rail line near occupied Sevastopol, Crimea on March 9
and impeded the transport of ammunition.[78] The Atesh group reported
that Ukrainian partisans conducted another attack targeting unspecified
Russian rail lines in occupied Crimea on March 12 and noted that it will
take time for Russian authorities to restore the affected rail lines.
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian
forces launched a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine
on the night of March 11 to 12. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that
Russian forces launched three Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from
occupied Crimea and 133 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of
Oryol, Kursk, and Bryansk cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo,
Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape
Chauda, Crimea.[79] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian
forces downed 98 drones over Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy Chernihiv, Cherkasy,
Kyiv, Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi, Vinnytsia, Ternopil, Rivne,
Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Odesa and Kherson oblasts and that 20 decoy
drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW)
interference.[80] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones
struck Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, and Sumy oblasts and that
Russian missiles and drones damaged civilian and energy infrastructure
in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and a civilian Barbados-flagged ship and port
infrastructure in Odesa City.[81] Ukrainian officials reported that the
Russian ballistic missiles that struck the port of Odesa and the
Barbados-flagged ship likely had cluster munition warheads.[82]
Ukrainian officials reported on March 12 that Russian forces conducted a
"double-tap" missile strike, likely with an Iskander-M missile, against
Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast following March 11 strikes on
residential, administrative, and enterprise infrastructure in and near
the city.[83]
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Nothing significant to report.
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)
Nothing significant to report.
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
(Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed
areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural,
economic, military, and governance systems)
ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Belarusian
Defense Minister Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin met with Iranian
Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Major General Aziz Nasir
Zadeh in Minsk on March 12 and discussed strengthening bilateral
military cooperation.[84]
Note: ISW does not receive any
classified material from any source, uses only publicly available
information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western
reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite
imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports.
References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each
update.
[1] https://tass dot ru/politika/23373927 ; https://t.me/rian_ru/284768
[2] https://t.me/tass_agency/305257
[3] https://t.me/svobodnieslova/6487
[4]
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-lawmaker-says-any-ukraine-deal-will-be-moscows-terms-not-washingtons-2025-03-12/
[5] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-03-12/putin-eyes-way-to-agree-to-truce-terms-with-his-own-conditions
[6]
https://isw.pub/UkrWar030725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030125;
https://isw.pub/UkrWar022825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022725;
https://isw.pub/UkrWar022525
[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031125;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage;
https://x.com/MFA_Ukraine/status/1899523451398013397;
https://www.president dot
gov.ua/en/news/spilna-zayava-za-pidsumkami-zustrichi-delegacij-ukrayini-ta-96553
[8] https://t.me/svobodnieslova/6487
[9] https://www.president dot gov.ua/en/news/spilna-zayava-za-pidsumkami-zustrichi-delegacij-ukrayini-ta-96553
[10]
https://www.c-span.org/program/news-conference/secretary-rubio-and-national-security-adviser-waltz-speak-to-reporters-in-saudi-arabia/657068
[11] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cly4gldd5ljo
[12]
https://suspilne dot
media/968295-zelenskij-ukraina-gotova-do-pripinenna-vognu-risenna-za-rosieu/;
https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13544
[13]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2024;
https://isw.pub/UkrWar121924
[14]
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2025;
https://tass dot ru/politika/22220403; https://tass dot
ru/politika/22059349; https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/999586;
https://interaffairs dot ru/news/show/50623; https://www.interfax dot
ru/russia/1010498; https://russian.rt dot
com/opinion/1447542-shafran-nato-mirotvorcy-ukraina; https://sputnik dot
by/20250307/peskov-osnovoy-peregovorov-po-ukraine-mogut-stat-stambulskie-soglasheniya-1094265351.html
[15] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2025
[16]
https://isw.pub/UkrWar030625;
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-12-2025;
https://isw.pub/UkrWar031025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022625;
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2025;
https://isw.pub/UkrWar022025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar013025;
https://isw.pub/UkrWar012025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122924
[17] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/03/12/trump-russia-ukraine-negotiations-fsb-document/
[18] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030225
[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030625
[20] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76446
[21]
http://svr.gov dot
ru/smi/2025/03/costoyalsya-telefonnyy-razgovor-direktora-svr-rossii-s-e-naryshkina-s-glavoy-tsru-ssha-dzh-retkliffo.htm;
https://t.me/MID_Russia/53568
[22]
https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1899721021306949748;
https://x.com/Richer214469/status/1899713359546896503;
https://t.me/divgen/64847; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8621;
https://t.me/SolovievLive/314468; https://t.me/rodnaya_sudzha/13945
[23]
https://deepstatemap dot live/en#14/51.1889194/35.2550411 ;
https://suspilne dot
media/968353-ssa-vidnovili-vijskovu-dopomogu-ukraini-tramp-hoce-peregovoriti-z-putinim-1113-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1741784339&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps
[24]
https://t.me/RVvoenkor/87790 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/87806 ;
https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62781 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62781 ;
https://t.me/RVvoenkor/87767 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33382 ;
https://t.me/dva_majors/66544 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/21602
[25]
https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/26360;
https://x.com/Raver__/status/1899718473275600953;
https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8617; https://t.me/kozakgyluntv/21196;
https://x.com/TuiteroMartin/status/1899725430933926181
[26] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31096 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33382 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31096
[27] https://t.me/rybar/68776 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/87822 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21796 ;
[28] https://t.me/notes_veterans/22420
[29]
https://t.me/dva_majors/66542 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/21602 ;
https://t.me/epoddubny/22765 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25222
[30]
https://isw.pub/UkrWar030525 ;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-11-2025
[31] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76446
[32] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65007289
[33] https://t.me/mod_russia/50027 ; https://t.me/news_kremlin/5306
[34]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aNQDHfFjeoeW6onDmxKw2Z3hE59ah8U8FVTDA4qS8fjH8fmBhbn9EanUdH9yHH9Zl;
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21911; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6241
[35]
https://suspilne dot
media/kharkiv/968413-u-brigadi-gart-prokomentuvali-mozlivist-aktivizacii-bojovih-dij-na-pivnoci-harkivsini/
[36]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021xEtMmNrgVHrqKRmCGRVhdDTrNtFzTYuPs85Q83aNM3YMTiv1yg666ydEUPymzLcl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aNQDHfFjeoeW6onDmxKw2Z3hE59ah8U8FVTDA4qS8fjH8fmBhbn9EanUdH9yHH9Zl;
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21911; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6241
[37] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6225; https://t.me/nemesis_412/242
[38]
https://suspilne dot
media/kharkiv/968331-rosia-provela-40-atak-na-kupanskomu-napramku-za-den-komentar-recnika-osuv-hortica/
[39] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8614; https://t.me/seekservice/4393
[40] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8614; https://t.me/seekservice/4393
[41]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021xEtMmNrgVHrqKRmCGRVhdDTrNtFzTYuPs85Q83aNM3YMTiv1yg666ydEUPymzLcl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aNQDHfFjeoeW6onDmxKw2Z3hE59ah8U8FVTDA4qS8fjH8fmBhbn9EanUdH9yHH9Zl;
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21911; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6241
[42] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25220; https:// t.me/z_arhiv/31099
[43]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021xEtMmNrgVHrqKRmCGRVhdDTrNtFzTYuPs85Q83aNM3YMTiv1yg666ydEUPymzLcl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aNQDHfFjeoeW6onDmxKw2Z3hE59ah8U8FVTDA4qS8fjH8fmBhbn9EanUdH9yHH9Zl;
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21911; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6241
[44] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/968917-duze-bagato-vipadkiv-strileckogo-bou-recnik-60-brigadi-pro-limanskij-napramok/
[45]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021xEtMmNrgVHrqKRmCGRVhdDTrNtFzTYuPs85Q83aNM3YMTiv1yg666ydEUPymzLcl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aNQDHfFjeoeW6onDmxKw2Z3hE59ah8U8FVTDA4qS8fjH8fmBhbn9EanUdH9yHH9Zl;
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21911l; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6241
[46] https://t.me/epoddubny/22773
[47]
https://t.me/mod_russia/49999; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20808;
https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20814; https://t.me/yurasumy/21797
[48] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25206
[49]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aNQDHfFjeoeW6onDmxKw2Z3hE59ah8U8FVTDA4qS8fjH8fmBhbn9EanUdH9yHH9Zl;
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21911; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6241;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aNQDHfFjeoeW6onDmxKw2Z3hE59ah8U8FVTDA4qS8fjH8fmBhbn9EanUdH9yHH9Zl;
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21911; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6241;
https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25206
[50]
https://t.me/mod_russia/50004; https://t.me/epoddubny/22764;
https://t.me/RVvoenkor/87761; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33446;
https://t.me/motopatriot78/33447; https://t.me/basurin_e/17536
[51] https://t.me/mod_russia/50012
[52]
https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1899742141246521551;
https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1899742485175242757;
https://t.me/arkhangelfront/14306; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8615
[53]
https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1899779271956049942;
https://t.me/Khyzhak_brigade/734;
https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1899728252358291599;
https://www.instagram.com/p/DHDj6SFoIVL/
[54]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021xEtMmNrgVHrqKRmCGRVhdDTrNtFzTYuPs85Q83aNM3YMTiv1yg666ydEUPymzLcl;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aNQDHfFjeoeW6onDmxKw2Z3hE59ah8U8FVTDA4qS8fjH8fmBhbn9EanUdH9yHH9Zl
; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21911
[55] https://t.me/wargonzo/25255; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/157478; https://t.me/mod_russia/50004
[56] https://t.me/ombr_28/1900
[57]
https://suspilne dot
media/donbas/968685-vranci-rosijski-vijskovi-namagalis-zajti-na-ukrainski-pozicii-v-rajoni-druzbi-na-toreckomu-fronti-28-ombr/
[58] https://t.me/dva_majors/66530; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/157478
[59] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13534
[60] https://t.me/HYENAGR0UP/186; https://x.com/Ryan72101/status/1899781968373456984
[61] https://t.me/yurasumy/21799
[62] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62784 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25235
[63]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021xEtMmNrgVHrqKRmCGRVhdDTrNtFzTYuPs85Q83aNM3YMTiv1yg666ydEUPymzLcl
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aNQDHfFjeoeW6onDmxKw2Z3hE59ah8U8FVTDA4qS8fjH8fmBhbn9EanUdH9yHH9Zl
; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21911 ;
https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6241 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62787 ;
https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62784 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/66526 ;
https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25235
[64] https://armyinform.com
dot
ua/2025/03/12/vchora-nakroshyly-yih-sogodni-takozh-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-praczyuye-standartna-aryfmetyka-vijny/
[65]
https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2025/03/12/lyudy-v-nyh-zakinchuyutsya-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-rosiyany-shturmuyut-z-velycheznymy-vtratamy/
[66] https://t.me/mod_russia/50010
[67] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13536
[68]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021xEtMmNrgVHrqKRmCGRVhdDTrNtFzTYuPs85Q83aNM3YMTiv1yg666ydEUPymzLcl
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021xEtMmNrgVHrqKRmCGRVhdDTrNtFzTYuPs85Q83aNM3YMTiv1yg666ydEUPymzLcl
; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21911
[69] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8624; https://t.me/voin_dv/13852
[70]
https://t.me/mod_russia/49999 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/50005 ;
https://t.me/rybar/68782 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25214 ;
https://t.me/RVvoenkor/87762 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31102
[71] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/62807; https://t.me/rybar/68782
[72]
https://t.me/motopatriot78/33391 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/87781 ;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-2-2025
[73]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021xEtMmNrgVHrqKRmCGRVhdDTrNtFzTYuPs85Q83aNM3YMTiv1yg666ydEUPymzLcl
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aNQDHfFjeoeW6onDmxKw2Z3hE59ah8U8FVTDA4qS8fjH8fmBhbn9EanUdH9yHH9Zl
; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21911
[74]
https://t.me/dva_majors/66526 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25204 ;
https://t.me/wargonzo/25255 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/21594 ;
https://t.me/tass_agency/305196
[75]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid021xEtMmNrgVHrqKRmCGRVhdDTrNtFzTYuPs85Q83aNM3YMTiv1yg666ydEUPymzLcl
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aNQDHfFjeoeW6onDmxKw2Z3hE59ah8U8FVTDA4qS8fjH8fmBhbn9EanUdH9yHH9Zl
; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21911 ;
https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25204
[76] https://t.me/rusich_army/21594
[77]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aNQDHfFjeoeW6onDmxKw2Z3hE59ah8U8FVTDA4qS8fjH8fmBhbn9EanUdH9yHH9Zl
; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/21911
[78] https://t.me/atesh_ua/6490
[79] https://t.me/kpszsu/30457
[80] https://t.me/olexandrprokudin/6668
[81]
https://t.me/kpszsu/30457; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/39450 ;
https://armyinform dot
com.ua/2025/03/12/ryatuvalnyky-pokazaly-naslidky-podvijnogo-raketnogo-udaru-rf-po-kryvomu-rogu/
; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/20024 ; https://suspilne dot
media/dnipro/968401-vibuhi-u-krivomu-rozi-poranena-ludina-vlucanna-v-infrastrukturij-obekt/
; https://t.me/vilkul/9934; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/17695;
https://suspilne dot
media/dnipro/968561-znisenij-gotel-ta-udar-po-medikah-so-rozpovili-mistani-pro-ataku-balistikou-na-krivij-rig/
; https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2025/03/12/kryvyj-rig-zaznav-podvijnoyi-raketnoyi-ataky-rf-ye-zagybla-ta-poraneni/;
https://t.me/vilkul/9935 ; https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2025/03/12/u-kryvomu-rozi-zbilshylas-kilkist-postrazhdalyh-unaslidok-raketnoyi-ataky-rf/;
https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/20044; https://t.me/bbcrussian/77678 ;
https://t.me/bbcrussian/77678 ; https://t.me/odesa_prokuratura/1127 ;
https://armyinform dot
com.ua/2025/03/12/vnaslidok-rosijskogo-udaru-po-odesi-zagynulo-4-inozemnyh-moryaky-torgovogo-flotu/
; https://t.me/odesa_prokuratura/1127; https://suspilne dot
media/odesa/968423-rf-atakuvala-priportovu-infrastrukturu-odesi-e-zagibli-ta-poraneni-prokuratura-rozpocala-rozsliduvanna/
; https://t.me/OleksiiKuleba/5599; ; https://suspilne dot
media/odesa/968861-v-ova-povidomili-pro-stan-sirijca-poranenogo-pid-cas-ataki-rf-na-port-odesi/;
https://suspilne dot
media/odesa/969003-armia-rf-udarila-po-odeskomu-portu-kasetnou-raketou-golova-ova/;
https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid0325fXV6AGYFfoK17sRyYoqHKuEmYqzBtWkhZnJDScFseAn15UNptHqvReRPEFpDmHl&id=61567775044855;
[82]
https://t.me/odesa_prokuratura/1127 ; https://armyinform dot
com.ua/2025/03/12/vnaslidok-rosijskogo-udaru-po-odesi-zagynulo-4-inozemnyh-moryaky-torgovogo-flotu/;
https://suspilne dot
media/odesa/969003-armia-rf-udarila-po-odeskomu-portu-kasetnou-raketou-golova-ova/;
https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid0325fXV6AGYFfoK17sRyYoqHKuEmYqzBtWkhZnJDScFseAn15UNptHqvReRPEFpDmHl&id=61567775044855
[83]https://t.me/dsns_telegram/39450;
https://armyinform dot
com.ua/2025/03/12/ryatuvalnyky-pokazaly-naslidky-podvijnogo-raketnogo-udaru-rf-po-kryvomu-rogu/;
https://t.me/vilkul/9934; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/17695;
https://suspilne dot
media/dnipro/968561-znisenij-gotel-ta-udar-po-medikah-so-rozpovili-mistani-pro-ataku-balistikou-na-krivij-rig/
[84]
https://t.me/modmilby/45814 ; https://t.me/modmilby/45810 ;
https://t.me/modmilby/45815 ; https://t.me/modmilby/45820 ;
https://t.me/modmilby/45826 ; https://t.me/belta_telegramm/299325
